Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee

 

 

 

Autumn 2012 subsidiarity monitoring report (September – December 2012)

 

Date of paper:

February 2013

 


This briefing has been produced by the Research Service for use by the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee.

For further information, contact Owain Roberts in the Research Service
Telephone ext. 8584
Email: (
owain.roberts@wales.gov.uk)



 

 


 

Contents

1.          Introduction. 3

2.          The monitoring process. 4

3.          Overview of draft EU legislative proposals received (September 2012 – December 2012) 5

3.1.      EU legislative proposals that did not raise any subsidiarity concerns. 5

 

 

 



1.         Introduction

Under Standing Order 21, a “responsible committee” in the Assembly (currently the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee) is empowered to consider draft EU legislation that relates to matters within the legislative competence of the Assembly or to the functions of the Welsh Ministers and of the Counsel General, to identify whether it complies with the principle of subsidiarity.

The principle of subsidiarity is enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union:

1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.

3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.

The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.

4. Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.

The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.[1]

In addition, the application of the principle is governed by the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The relevant part in relation to the work of the Assembly is included in the first paragraph of Article 6:

Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national Parliament or each chamber of a national Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers. [RS emphasis][2]

 

2.         The monitoring process

In order to ensure that the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee fulfils its subsidiarity monitoring function effectively as set out in Standing Orders, Assembly officials monitor all draft EU legislative proposals that apply to Wales on a systematic basis to check whether they raise any subsidiarity concerns. The way in which Assembly officials monitor these proposals is outlined below for information:

¡  The Assembly in the first instance is notified of all proposals published by the European Commission for consideration through a list (known as the “batch list”) which is sent by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on behalf of the UK Government to the Assembly’s Research Service for information.

¡  The relevant UK Government department will then prepare an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) based on the proposals included on the batch list usually within 4 to 6 weeks of the initial notification by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Each EM includes an assessment of the policy impact of the proposals (including whether the UK Government department believes the proposal raises any subsidiarity concerns). Copies of each EM are sent to the Assembly via the Research Service.

¡  The Research Service filters the EMs received to check whether the proposal they relate to are “legislative” or “non-legislative”[3] and whether they encompass issues which may be of interest to the Assembly (i.e. relating to devolved matters).

¡  Those EMs that relate to proposals that are both “legislative” and deal with issues of interest to the Assembly are then checked further by officials from the Assembly’s Legal Services, Brussels Office and the Research Service to see whether they raise any potential subsidiarity concerns.

¡  If a proposal raises subsidiarity concerns, Assembly officials will alert the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee immediately whereupon Members will be asked to consider whether the Committee should ask either or both Houses at Westminster to issue a “reasoned opinion” on the proposal or not.

¡  Those proposals which are “legislative” and relate to devolved matters but raise no subsidiarity concerns are then collated in a monitoring report produced by the Research Service which is considered as a paper to note by the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee during each term in an Assembly year (Autumn [September-December], Spring [January-April] and Summer [May – August]).

.0pt'>Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, C310/207, 16 December 2004

[3] Subsidiarity concerns can only be raised in relation to draft “legislative” proposals.